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INTRODUCTION
The IDEA1 has revolutionized the way children with disabili-
ties are educated in the United States. A unique statutory scheme
requiring public schools to open their doors to children with disa-
bilities, the IDEA rejected a one-size-fits-all concept of education
and armed families with an unprecedented right to an education.2
† J.D., LL.M., Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I am fortunate to have had
balance in my life among pursuit of professional aspiration, intellectual development,
attending to a marriage and building a family. Joe, Allison, Laura and my entire ex-
tended family, you are the most meaningful dimension of my life. Many thanks to
Professor Kate Shaw of Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law for encouragement and
sound guidance in the development of this Article and the entire staff of Partnership
for Children’s Rights. To the CUNY Law Review board, thanks for your enthusiasm for
bringing attention to special education issues in academia.
1 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012) (re-
ferred to throughout as “the IDEA” or “the Act”).
2 Prior to enactment of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (the IDEA’s predecessor in name), students who were
deemed “uneducable and untrainable” were segregated from the general population
and, in the early 1970s, suspensions of thousands of students were employed to ex-
clude special needs children from education. S. REP. NO. 104-275, at 7, 10–11 (1996),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-104srpt275/pdf/CRPT-104srpt275
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Public schools would be required to figure out how to educate stu-
dents with a myriad of differences through classroom accommoda-
tions, services and supports in the “least restrictive environment.”3
The Act seeks to empower the weakest parties in the administrative
process: children with disabilities and their parents.4 The primacy
of this value is explicit in the precatory section of the current
IDEA, which states that “[a]lmost 30 years of research and experi-
ence ha[ve] demonstrated that the education of children with disa-
bilities can be made more effective by . . . strengthening the role
and responsibilities of parents and ensuring that families of such
children have meaningful opportunities to participate in the edu-
cation of their children at school and at home.”5
To effectuate its goals, the statute establishes by positive man-
date a collaborative process in which schools and parents identify,
evaluate, and determine each child’s educational needs and needs
for related services. The end product of this process is a document
called an Individualized Educational Program (IEP).6 The IEP pro-
vides a “written statement”7 of a student’s educational goals as well
.pdf. See also Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural Due Process in Special
Education Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415, 421–22 (2011); Gabriela Brizuela, Note,
Making the “IDEA” a Reality: Providing a Free and Appropriate Public Education for Children
with Disabilities Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 45 VAL. U. L. REV.
595, 597–600 (2011); Jeffrey A. Knight, Comment, When Close Enough Doesn’t Cut it:
Why Courts Should Want to Steer Clear of Determining What is—and What is Not—Material
in a Child’s Individual Education Program, 41 U. TOL. L.REV. 375, 377–388 (2010);
Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Special Educational Inclusion and the Courts: A
Proposal for a New Remedial Approach, 25 J. L. & EDUC. 523, 531–32 (1996); Daniel H.
Melvin II, Comment, The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, 44 DEPAUL L. REV.
599, 603–04 (1995).
3 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5). See generally Melvin, supra note 2.
4 See Daniela Caruso, Bargaining and Distribution in Special Education, 14 CORNELL J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 174–75 (2005); Debra Chopp, School Districts and Families Under
the IDEA: Collaborative in Theory, Adversarial in Fact, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDIC.
423, 425 (2012); Romberg, supra note 2, at 438; Martin A. Kotler, The Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act: A Parent’s Perspective and Proposal for Change, 27 U.MICH. J. L.
REF. 331, 340 (1994); David M. Engel, Law Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educa-
tional Rights and the Construction of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 168 (1991).
5 20 U.S.C. §1400(c)(5). See also S. REP. NO. 104-275, at 14–15 (1996) (recogniz-
ing that parents often “feel largely left out of the IEP process” and “their unsuccessful
efforts to obtain appropriate services for their children”). But see Philip T.K. Daniel,
Education of Students with Special Needs: The Judicially Defined Role of Parents in the Process,
29 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 5 (2000) (considering the expanded protection for parents under
the 1997 amendments to the IDEA and stating that a lack of effective consequences
encourages school districts to “take only minimal steps” toward “collaboration with
parents”). The paucity of effective consequences remains a truth under the subse-
quent 2004 amendments to the IDEA.
6 20 U.S.C. § 1401(14).
7 Id.
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as the educational program and related services that will be pro-
vided by the school district.8 Thus, execution of the IDEA man-
dates occurs at the local school district level, subject to state
regulations and the IDEA.9 Each state’s regulations are unique.10
The IDEA requires states to establish procedures parents may
use to challenge decisions made by their local education agency
relative to their child’s education, including the sufficiency of the
education offered to their child as expressed in the child’s IEP.11
8 The IDEA encompasses a continuum, starting with identification and evaluation
of a student to determine whether they qualify to be classified as disabled under the
IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a). Once a determination has been made that a student is
disabled within the meaning of the statute, the process of formulating an individual-
ized program begins. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(14). The statute provides no standard with
regard to implementation, and this issue has been addressed through litigation. Par-
ents can challenge a school district at any point along the continuum, from refusal to
evaluate or classify through failure to implement an IEP. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 8, § 200.5(i) (2013). The most common dispute arises over the legal ade-
quacy of an IEP, and parents most commonly seek “specialized services, private school
tuition and compensatory education.” See David Ferster, Broken Promises: When Does a
School’s Failure to Implement an Individualized Education Program Deny a Disabled Student of
a Free and Appropriate Public Education, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 71, 75, 86–87 (2010).
Note also that the terms “district” and “school” will be used interchangeably in this
Article.
9 Local determinations, however, are informed by regulations promulgated by the
U.S. Department of Education and regulations promulgated by state education de-
partments, which vary by state.
10 Regulations of the New York State Education Commissioner will be the ones
referred to in this Article, since the case that is the subject of this Article arose in New
York. Massachusetts regulations, for example, differ from New York’s. Whereas New
York regulations contain absolutely no substantive, qualitative standard for what a
school must provide, Massachusetts requires an education that permits a student to
progress effectively in the general education program, which means the acquisition of
knowledge and skills “according to the individual educational potential of the stu-
dent.” 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 28.02(17) (2011). Massachusetts regulations also confer
upon parents the “right to observe any program(s) proposed for their child.” Id. 28.07
(1)(a)(3). Differences are also seen in the IEP forms developed by each state. Though
the contents are primarily dictated by the IDEA, forms vary among the states. The
Massachusetts form, for example, includes a “vision statement” for each student based
on prospective educational expectations. New York’s form asks for identification of
the student’s “expected rate of progress in acquiring skills and information and learn-
ing style.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 2001(i)(a).
11 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). These complaints are referred to, interchangeably, as
“due process complaints” or “impartial hearing requests.” New York has a two-tiered
administrative process for resolving disputes between parents and school districts. A
dispute, if not resolved by mediation or within the thirty-day resolution period com-
mencing upon filing of a complaint, is heard by an Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO)
and may be appealed to a State Review Officer (SRO), with a right to appeal to state
supreme or federal district court. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 4404.1–4404.3 (McKinney
2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.5(j)–(k). Massachusetts, in contrast,
has a single level of review by the Bureau of Special Education Appeals, which
promulgates its own rules. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71B, § 2A (2010); 603 MASS. CODE
REGS. 28.08. The right to appeal to a state or federal district court is found in Rule
198 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:195
In general, parents who reject an IEP may select an alternative
placement and proceed against the school district for tuition reim-
bursement.12 Though the IDEA plainly specifies that the IEP serve
as a written statement of, among other things, the services the
school will provide to the child, an open issue is whether contract
law concepts should be called upon in this area of jurisprudence.13
The recent case of R.E. v. New York City Department of Educa-
tion,14 decided in September 2012, expressly addressed this issue.
The case consolidated the claims of three different families. The
families had asserted that their children’s IEPs failed to include
services necessary to an educational program for their children
that could meet the IDEA’s requirements. One of the issues ad-
dressed concerned whether school district testimony about how
those very services—which were not described in the respective
children’s IEPs—would have been provided had the children en-
rolled in the public program.15 Thus, the court was presented with
the issue of whether the sufficiency of an IEP is to be judged exclu-
sively by reference to the writing, or whether to consider testimony
given after formulation of an IEP about how a child might have
been given supports and services that were not otherwise provided
for in the written document. The Second Circuit rejected a rule
that would have restricted evaluation of the offered education to
an IEP document, but stated that after-the-fact testimony could not
be offered to remedy an otherwise defective IEP.
To place the discussion in perspective, this Article will first dis-
XIV of the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education Hear-
ing Rules for Special Education. See 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 28.08(6).
12 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412, 1415(a)(10)(C)(iii).
13 Congress did not intend for the IEP to be a contract between parent and school
or a guarantee of any particular outcome; instead, the writing was to “ensure ade-
quate involvement” of the parent and child. S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 11–12 (1975),
available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED112561.pdf. The Senate Committee
further recognized that outcomes could not be guaranteed, but that the written plan
would “emphasize the process of parent and child involvement and . . . create a writ-
ten record of reasonable expectations.” Id. The statutory requirement of a writing is
not “merely technical”; instead, it creates “a clear record of the educational place-
ment and other services offered to the parents.” Knable v. Bexley Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d
755, 768 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir.
1994)).
14 R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
2802 (2013). In this Article, the New York City Department of Education will be re-
ferred to as the DOE.
15 Id. at 185. The court also considered the level of deference to be accorded to
administrative decisions in the IDEA context and whether failure to strictly adhere to
state regulations constitutes a per se IDEA violation. See id. at 188–90. This Article
evaluates the court’s decision relative to retrospective testimony only.
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cuss the IDEA’s history, with special attention to the legislative his-
tory as it pertains to the intended legal function of the IEP. The
next section will discuss the current IDEA statutory framework, also
focusing primarily on IEP formulation and content requirements
and provisions for dispute resolution procedures. The R.E. deci-
sion will then be discussed in detail. Finally, the Article will analyze
the legal import courts should confer upon the IEP document, tak-
ing into consideration legislative intent and additional case law.
The fuzzy terminology in the IDEA has impeded the efficacy
of the IEP as a protective device. Notwithstanding provisions for
administrative procedures to resolve disputes between families and
school districts,16 the IDEA, in fact, has blunt teeth.17 This Article
will argue that courts should recognize IEPs as quasi-contracts and
apply contract law concepts to IEP disputes. Alternatively, Congress
should rephrase its characterization of the IEP, calling it—at a min-
imum—a written agreement. This appellation would promote the
IDEA’s normative values, recognize the descriptive constructs that
have developed over the thirty years of the IDEA’s existence,18 and
empower and protect parents of children with disabilities.
I. HISTORY OF THE IDEA
Prior to the 1960s, exclusion of people with disabilities from
mainstream education was accepted and even upheld.19 In fact, at
that time, special education was reserved for students with behav-
ioral problems. The physically or intellectually disabled were
barred from mainstream schools, as well.20 The 1960s ushered in
an overall progressive societal shift. A movement emerged that was
bent on eradicating political structures that marginalized minori-
ties and the poor, with the objective of opening the doors of op-
portunity to all. Education did not escape this shift.
16 20 U.S.C. §1415(b)(6)(A).
17 See Daniel, supra note 5.
18 See Caruso, supra note 4, at 175–76. (“The use of contractual jargon makes and
is designed to make a powerful impression upon both parents and school district
personnel . . . IEPs are referred to as contracts; therefore parents are led to believe
they must be different. Administrators also share the sense that a contract is a higher,
more immediate and accountable form of commitment toward children with disabili-
ties than their generic duty to implement state and federal laws . . . an IEP is not a
contract in a formal sense.”)
19 See Romberg, supra note 2, at 421–22 (citing Kotler, supra note 4, at 343); Fer-
ster, supra note 8, at 77; Daniel, supra note 5, at 5. See also Levine v. State Dep’t of
Insts. & Agencies, 84 N.J. 234 (1980) (stating that the constitutional right to an educa-
tion does not extend to children classified as “subtrainable”).
20 Knight, supra note 2, at 378; Melvin, supra note 2, at 603–04.
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Brown v. Board of Education21 addressed the inequities of educa-
tional systems that segregated black children, holding that separate
educational facilities were inherently unequal and thus violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.22 In Brown, the Supreme Court noted the
importance of education to society, stating:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance
laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate
our recognition of the importance of education to our demo-
cratic society. It is required in the performance of our most ba-
sic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is
the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in prepar-
ing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if
he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportu-
nity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms.23
Brown also introduced a conceptual tension between education as
an exclusively local service as opposed to a broader matter impli-
cating constitutional rights and served to encourage people with
disabilities to seek parity.24
President Johnson’s Great Society program continued the
trend and led to enactment of educational programs for economi-
cally disadvantaged children in 1965 through the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA).25 Through amendments to the
ESEA in 1966, Congress added a grant program for education of
21 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22 Id. at 493–95.
23 Id. at 493.
24 See Knight, supra note 2, at 377–78. See also Romberg, supra note 2, at 421–22;
Brizuela, supra note 2, at 597–98; Theresa M. DeMonte, Comment, Finding the Least
Restrictive Environment for Preschoolers Under the IDEA: An Analysis and Proposed Frame-
work, 85 WASH. L. REV. 157, 161 (2010); Melvin, supra note 2, at 606–07; PETER W.D.
WRIGHT & PAMELA DARR WRIGHT, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 12–13 (Harbor House Law
Press, 2d ed. 2010).
25 Knight, supra note 2, at 378 (calling the ESEA a “centerpiece of President Lyn-
don Johnson’s ‘Great Society,’” and noting that President Johnson played an integral
role in introducing the ESEA bill into Congress and seeing to its rapid passage—with
no amendments and little debate—in just eighty-seven days). Knight notes, however,
that none of the programs developed by the states under the ESEA “produced the
results that Congress, and advocates alike, sought to achieve.” Id. See also Derek Black,
Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First Step Toward Educa-
tion as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1358 (2010) (noting that
the ESEA was the federal government’s first attempt to equalize funding in public
schools through provision of supplemental funds).
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handicapped children.26 The Education of the Handicapped Act
(EHA) was enacted in 1970, and continued the grant for develop-
ment of programs for students with disabilities by the states, but set
neither substantive educational standards nor procedural
requirements.27
In this atmosphere, parents of children with disabilities sought
to effect radical social change in the direction of inclusion.28 The
seeds of what ultimately became the IDEA are attributed to two
cases, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania (P.A.R.C.) and Mills v. Board of Education of D.C.
(Mills).29 The courts in these two cases held that due process and
equal protection under the United States Constitution require
what have become the basic articles of faith in special education:
where a state has undertaken to educate its children, children with
disabilities living within the state are entitled to a free, appropriate
education in public schools that meets their individual needs and
capacities; that states have an obligation to identify children with
disabilities; and that parents are entitled to involvement in deci-
sion-making and can seek to enforce their children’s rights.30
The germs of the phrase “free and appropriate public educa-
tion,” now firmly entrenched in the law of special education, are
found in the P.A.R.C. decree.31 Other elements of the P.A.R.C. de-
26 See S. REP. NO. 104-275, at 7 (1996).
27 Id. See also Engel, supra note 4, at 170–71.
28 DeMonte, supra note 24, at 160–61. See also Knight, supra note 2, at 380; Lauren
A. Larson, Comment, Beyond Conventional Education: A Definition of Education Under the
Education For All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63,
67–68 (1985); Melvin, supra note 2, at 606–07.
29 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) [hereinafter P.A.R.C.]; 348 F. Supp. 866
(D.D.C. 1972). See also Romberg, supra, note 2, at 422–24 (noting that after the deci-
sions in P.A.R.C. and Mills, Congress enacted the EAHCA, incorporating “many of the
robust procedural rights granted to disabled children” in those decisions); Knight,
supra note 2, at 379 (noting that these two landmark cases signaled the advent of
change); Engel, supra note 4, at 171–73 (noting that the EHA adopted the use of
procedural protections to promote the legal rights of children with disabilities);
Brizuela, supra note 2, at 598–600 (“P.A.R.C. and Mills established the principle that
students with disabilities are entitled to a FAPE.”). See also Daniel, supra note 5, at 6
(noting the “sordid history” of parental exclusion from educational decision-making
until the advent of P.A.R.C.  and Mills, as well as persistence of other advocates, lead-
ing to the ESEA’s enactment).
30 See Knight, supra note 2, at 379; Brizuela, supra note 2, at 598–600; Engel, supra
note 4, at 171–73.
31 P.A.R.C., 334 F. Supp. at 1266. The consent decree obligated Pennsylvania to
provide a “free public education of education and training appropriate to [the
child’s] learning capacities” to the mentally retarded and “exceptional” children.
Pennsylvania was further barred from applying statutes denying exceptional children
access to public education and was charged with developing programs to educate
202 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:195
cree that were ultimately incorporated into the IDEA were the con-
cept of notice and a parental due process right concerning
educational decisions, biennial evaluations and reimbursement of
private school tuition if the public school could not accommodate
the child’s learning needs.32
Plaintiffs in Mills33 also asserted that they were deprived of
their due process rights when their exceptional children were ex-
cluded from the public general education school system without
hearings. Some were intellectually disabled and others had behav-
ioral problems resulting from hyperactivity or emotional distur-
bance. The District of Columbia ultimately conceded its obligation
to provide education suited to the respective needs of the individ-
ual plaintiffs and entered into a consent decree that it then failed
to implement. Summary judgment was ultimately entered enforc-
ing the Mills decree.34
By granting summary judgment enforcing the decree, the
court extended the Brown35 principle of education as a civil right;
excluding exceptional students from compulsory education was
tantamount to segregation and rose to the level of a deprivation of
due process, contravening the Fifth Amendment.36 The decree in
Mills required staffing of a special education department, an identi-
fication component, a due process and hearing procedure, and in-
dividual plans for each child.37 The prospect of educational
benefit, a precursor of the Rowley38 standard, was another factor to
be considered in determining a child’s educational placement
under the Mills decree.39
The final decree in Mills required the District of Columbia to
provide any child with “a free and suitable publicly-supported edu-
cation regardless of the degree of the child’s mental, physical or
exceptional children. Notice to the affected class was also mandated. Id. at 1258–60.
The decree called for biennial evaluation of exceptional students enrolled in Penn-
sylvania’s programs. Id. at 1266.
32 Id. at 1262–63.
33 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 866.
34 Id. at 878.
35 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Melvin, supra note 2, at 606 (“Con-
stitutional theories of equal educational opportunity for children with disabilities are
rooted in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Brown.”).
36 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875.
37 Id. at 878–83.
38 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176
(1982) (establishing that the substantive standard for an “appropriate” education was
one that induced progress).
39 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878.
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emotional disability or impairment.”40 The District of Columbia
was ordered to compile a list identifying causes for nonattendance,
including “educable mentally retarded, trainable mentally re-
tarded, emotionally disturbed, specific learning disability, crip-
pled/other health impaired, hearing impaired, visually impaired,
multiple handicapped.”41 This list provided the footprint for the
various classifications of disabilities currently found in today’s
IDEA.42
Mills also enumerated what would become the IDEA’s proce-
dural foundations and the elements of the IEP. Specifically, all stu-
dents were to be “provided with a publicly-supported educational
program suited to his needs” and parents were to be notified of the
proposed program, with an opportunity to have a hearing if they
found the proposal objectionable.43 Notice of the program had to
be in writing and the notice had to advise the parent of their right
to object.44
Though P.A.R.C. and Mills established a public obligation to
educate children with disabilities, no supportive statute existed.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibited discrimination on the
basis of disability, but did not mandate inclusion of children with
disabilities in public school or expressly address the educational
needs of those children.45 Congress held additional hearings exam-
40 Id.
41 Id. at 879.
42 The IDEA defines a child with disabilities as
a child with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments (including
deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (includ-
ing blindness), serious emotional disturbance (referred to in this chap-
ter as ‘emotional disturbance’), orthopedic impairments, autism,
traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning
disabilities who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related
services.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2012). Children ages 3 through 9 are considered disabled if
they experience
developmental delays, as defined by the State and as measured by ap-
propriate diagnostic instruments and procedures, in [one] or more of
the following areas: physical development; cognitive development; com-
munication development; social or emotional development; or adaptive
development . . . who, by reason thereof, need[ ] special education and
related services.
Id. § 1401(3)(B).
43 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878–80.
44 Id. at 880–81. Mills also placed the burden upon the school district to establish
the sufficiency of the offered educational program. As in the current state of the law,
the Mills decree gave parents the right to cross-examine a school district’s witnesses
and to present their own witnesses. Id.
45 See Knight, supra note 2, at 381; WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 294.
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ining the status of children with disabilities in education, resulting
in the passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
(EAHCA)46 in November of 1975. The EAHCA incorporated the
elements articulated in P.A.R.C. and Mills, conferring a legal right
to a free, appropriate education and, in effect, codified the hold-
ings of those cases and afforded parents a means of enforcement.47
The primary objective of the law was to guarantee parents a say in
their children’s education and to foster the collaborative process.48
The lynchpin of the EAHCA was a prescribed meeting be-
tween parents and school districts at which an “individualized edu-
cation program” would be planned and developed. From the
outset, the IEP had to be formulated by the beginning of the
school year,49 and the formulation needed to be in writing.50 How-
ever, the Senate Committee that considered the EAHCA explicitly
stated in its report to the Senate: “It is not the Committee’s inten-
tion that the written statement developed at the individual plan-
ning conferences be construed as creating a contractual
relationship.”51
An IEP formulated under the EAHCA encompassed merely
five components:
(A) a statement of the present levels of educational perform-
ance of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including
46 Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-
142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1485 (2000 & Supp.
2005)). See also WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 14; Knight, supra note 2, at 381;
Romberg, supra note 2, at 424
47 See S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8 (1975) (“The Education Amendments of 1974 incor-
porated the major principles of the right to education cases. That Act added impor-
tant new provisions to the Education of the Handicapped Act which require the States
to: establish a goal of providing full educational opportunities to all handicapped
children; provide procedures for insuring that handicapped children and their par-
ents or guardians are guaranteed procedural safeguards in decisions regarding identi-
fication, evaluation, and educational placement of handicapped children; establish
procedures to insure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped chil-
dren, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are
educated with children who are not handicapped; and that special classes, separate
schooling, or other removal of handicapped children from the regular education en-
vironment occurs only when the nature of severity of the handicapped is such that
education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be
achieved satisfactorily . . . .” Id.). See also Knight, supra note 2, at 381; Rebell & Hughes,
supra note 2, at 534–35 (“[P.A.R.C.] and Mills led directly to Congress’ passage of the
Education of All Handicapped Children’s Act . . . the predecessor of the IDEA, in
1975.”).
48 See S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 11.
49 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A) (2012).
50 EAHCA § 602(19), 89 Stat. at 776.
51 S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 11.
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short-term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the spe-
cific educational services to be provided to such child, and the
extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular
educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and
anticipated duration of such services, and (E) appropriate objec-
tive criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for deter-
mining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional
objectives are being achieved.52
The IEP team envisioned by the EAHCA was also simple: an
IEP could be formulated in “any meeting” of “a representative of
the local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit
who shall be qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of,
specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of handi-
capped children, the teacher, the parents or guardian of such
child, and, whenever appropriate, such child.”53 The EAHCA in-
cluded procedural safeguards to protect parents. Educational
agencies could not evaluate a child, change their classification or
educational placement without first notifying the parent in writ-
ing.54 The EAHCA also provided for an enforcement procedure,
mandating states to develop administrative venues for resolving dis-
putes under the Act and permitting appeals to either state or fed-
eral court.55
The EAHCA resulted in an increase in the number of children
receiving special education, but this progress was far from perfect,
and the EAHCA was fine-tuned in successive amendments.56 The
1990 amendments57 introduced the name by which the Act is cur-
rently known—the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act or
IDEA.58
The IEP requirements remained unchanged until the 1997
52 EAHCA § 602(19), 89 Stat. at 776.
53 Id.
54 See EAHCA § 615(a), 89 Stat. at 788.
55 See id. § 615(b)–(e), 89 Stat. at 788–89.
56 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2012). Between 1976 and 1977, 3,694,000 students
were provided with special education; for the period between 2009 and 2010, this
figure increased to 6,481,000. See Students with Disabilities, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STA-
TISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=64 (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). See
also Ferster, supra note 8, at 78 (“Today, over six million students with disabilities are
served under the Act in public schools.”); 20 U.S.C. § 1400(3) (“Since the enactment
and implementation of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, this
chapter has been successful in ensuring children with disabilities and the families of
such children [have] access to a free appropriate public education and in improving
educational results for children with disabilities.”).
57 Pub. L. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990).
58 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-544, at 60 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1723, at
1783.
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amendments,59 in which the IEP requirements were greatly ampli-
fied. The 1997 amendments combined provisions referring to eval-
uations, reevaluation, and IEP development and review into
section 614 and called for a more comprehensive, sophisticated
IEP document.60 The law introduced a nominal substantive educa-
tional standard; the plan had to foster advancement in “attaining
the annual goals,” as well as enable the child “to be involved and
progress in the general curriculum.”61 Identification of the partici-
pants in the IEP team was also expanded. The team was now man-
dated to include the parents, teachers familiar with the child in the
educational setting, and special education teachers or other spe-
cialists involved in addressing the child’s special needs.62 The 1997
amendments required that IEPs include measurable goals,
benchmarks, and short-term objectives and specification of how
progress would be reported to parents.63 However, an overly rigid
document was not envisioned by Congress; the need for “specific
day-to-day adjustments” was acknowledged, but no adjustment
mechanism was codified.64
The last amendments of note were made in 2004.65 The 2004
amendments further refined the IEP development process.66 The
Amendments added procedures that allowed the IEP to be a more
59 Pub. L. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997).
60 See id. at 81, 86–88. The 1997 amendments also added 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(10)(C), predicating reimbursement of tuition for parents who unilaterally
enroll their children in private schools upon notice to the school district. See id. at 63.
See also Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247 (2009) (holding that reim-
bursement for the cost of private-school special education is authorized under the
IDEA “when a school district fails to provide a [free appropriate public education]
and the private-school placement is appropriate”).
61 111 Stat. at 84.
62 See id. at 85.
63 See id. at 83.
64 See S. REP. NO. 105-17, at 19–21 (1997), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/CRPT-105srpt17/pdf/CRPT-105srpt17.pdf (“Specific day-to-day adjustments in
instructional methods and approaches that are made by either a regular or special
education teacher to assist a disabled child to achieve his or her annual goals would
not normally require action by the child’s IEP team. However, if changes are contem-
plated in the child’s measurable annual goals, benchmarks, or short term objectives,
or in any of the services or program modifications, or other components described in
the child’s IEP, the [local educational agency] must ensure that the child’s IEP team
is reconvened in a timely manner to address those changes.” Id. at 20.).
65 Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004). The 2004 amendments renamed the
act the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Improvement Act, but the act is still
generally referred to as the IDEA.
66 While recitation of benchmarks and short-term objectives were eliminated to
reduce paperwork, periodic progress reports remained for parent protection. S. REP.
NO. 108-185, at 28–29 (2003), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108
srpt185/pdf/CRPT-108srpt185.pdf.
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fluid document. Informal, interim changes to the IEP are now per-
mitted upon agreement with the parents.67 States were permitted
to apply to participate in a pilot, multi-year IEP program.68 Paren-
tal participation in meetings by telephone or video conference was
permitted and, with written consent from the parent, IEP team
members whose areas would be unaffected by any IEP changes
were excused from development meetings.69 Unlike earlier ver-
sions, the current act emphasizes performance and advancement
in alignment with the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.70 Also, a
qualitative element was added; the services provided must be
“based on peer-reviewed research to the extent possible.”71 Overall,
both the process of IEP development and the IEP document itself
have increased in complexity since 1975.
Throughout its history, the IDEA required states to maintain
an administrative procedure for resolution of disputes between
parents and school districts.72 Under this section, states are re-
quired to establish procedures for resolution of complaints con-
cerning “identification, evaluation, or educational placement of
the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education
to such child,” including mediation.73 Appeal may be taken from
the administrative proceedings to state or federal court.74 Written
notification must be given to parents informing them of their pro-
cedural rights.75
The IDEA has wrought remarkable change. Its procedures
and procedural protections have evolved in complexity. However,
the statute’s primary mechanism, the IEP, is still referred to as
merely a written statement, and this seriously undermines the po-
tential for forceful protection for families of students with
disabilities.
II. IEPS AND PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN THE CURRENT IDEA
At its most basic, the overall objective of the IDEA is to level
the educational playing field for students with disabilities relative
67 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(D) (2012).
68 Id. § 1414(d)(5).
69 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(C)(ii)–(iii); id. § 1414(d)(C).
70 Knight, supra note 2, at 386; WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 15, 19.
71 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(IV); Knight, supra note 2, at 386.
72 Id. § 1415. See also supra note 11.
73 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6); id. § 1415(b)(5).
74 Id. § 1415(i)(1)–(3).
75 Id. § 1415(d)(1)(A).
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to their peers without disabilities.76 The ultimate aim is to provide
these students with a better, long-term outcome in terms of pro-
ductivity in adulthood.77 The federal statute sets forth a mandate
and prescribes structures to effectuate that mandate, but execution
is accomplished at a very local level, with state oversight and federal
support.78 The IDEA’s procedural structures also attempt to re-
dress the imbalance of power between parents and school
districts.79
The overarching mandate of the IDEA is provision of a free
and appropriate public education, or FAPE, to children who have
been classified as disabled.80 This is to be accomplished in the
“least restrictive environment.”81 Specifically, the statute states:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities,
including children in public or private institutions or other care
facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and
special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children
with disabilities from the regular educational environment oc-
curs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child
is such that education in regular classes with the use of supple-
mentary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.82
The statute proscribes four elements of a FAPE, namely an ed-
ucation with related services that have been a) provided at public
expense; b) that meet state standards; c) delivered at an appropri-
ate school in the state; and d) that are “provided in conformity
with the individualized education program.”83 Twice, the statute re-
76 See id. § 1400(d).
77 See id. § 1400(a)(5)(A)(ii); S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 9 (1975) (“With proper educa-
tion, many [children with disabilities] would be able to become productive citizens,
contributing to society instead of being forced to remain burdens.”). See also WRIGHT
& WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 14; S. REP. 104-275, at 7 (1996); Accountability and the
IDEA: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 107th Cong.
(2002), 2002 WL 1265416 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (discussing the
need for an educational system for students with disabilities that enables success in
school and later in life).
78 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(6); id. § 1400(d). Section 1402 established an Office of Spe-
cial Education Programs within the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative
Services of the U.S. Department of Education. Id. § 1402.
79 See generally supra note 4.
80 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). The substantive dimension of “appropriateness” is
not specified in the statute and is instead provided by case law that will be discussed
later in this section.
81 Id. § 1400(a)(5) (stating that funding allocations cannot “limit or condition the
right of a child with a disability . . . to receive a free appropriate public education . . .
in the least restrictive environment”).
82 Id. § 1412(a)(5).
83 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). But see M. C. ex rel. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60
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fers to the IEP as “a written statement”84 setting forth exactly what
will be provided in the educational sphere. Thus, the IEP is the
cornerstone, expressing the deliverables and outcomes that consti-
tute a FAPE for each particular child.
As for content, the IDEA currently requires that an IEP in-
clude an exhaustive description of the child from an academic and
social-emotional perspective, as well as an explanation of how the
child’s disability impacts her education and social-emotional devel-
opment, referred to as “present levels of performance.”85 It must
describe the impact of the child’s disability on her “involvement
and progress in the curriculum.”86 A set of “measurable annual
goals” must be included in the IEP, along with a statement of what
supports, related services, aids and/or modifications will be pro-
vided to attain the specified goals.87 Any decision to educate a stu-
dent outside of the general population must be explained in the
IEP.88 The IEP must state its effective date, the frequency, location
and duration of all services and include transition service plans
starting at age fourteen with annual revision.89
The statutory scheme emphasizes the rights and obligations of
parents and school districts in the IEP formulation process and in
(2d Cir. 2000) (stating that where FAPE has not been provided, an otherwise appro-
priate private school selected by the parent need not meet state standards).
84 20 U.S.C. § 1402(14). Section 1414  further refines the definition of IEPs and
specifies the information they must minimally contain. Id. § 1414(d)(1).
85 Id. § 1414(d). The language of the statute, which specifies what an IEP must
contain, is repeated in 34 C.F.R. § 300.320, the federal regulation that supplements
the IDEA. New York State regulations also repeat the language contained in 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d), but add a requirement that the IEP formulation committee “must consider
the results of the initial or most recent evaluation; the student’s strengths; the con-
cerns of the parents for enhancing the education of their child; the academic, devel-
opmental and functional needs of the student.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8,
§ 200.4(d)(2) (2013). “Functional performance” is defined as a student’s learning
characteristics or learning style. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8,
§ 200.1(ww)(3)(i)(a).
86 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(ii). Plans are also provided for preschool children
that must describe how the child’s disability impacts the child’s engagement in “ap-
propriate activities.” Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
87 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A). In theory, these objectives are laudable. However, goals are
often amorphous in both content and measurability. Material helpful to parents is
available on the Internet, providing examples of specific measurable goals. See, e.g.,
Smart IEPs, WRIGHTS LAW, http://www.wrightslaw.com/bks/feta2/ch12.ieps.pdf (last
visited Nov. 2, 2013).
88 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(V).
89 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (VII)–(VIII). Transition services under the IDEA
contemplate activities that will help a child move beyond school into the community
or college. Id. § 1401(34). Transition services in New York include services directed
toward helping a child move to less restrictive environments. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 8, § 200.1(fff).
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dispute resolution procedures. States must adopt procedures guar-
anteeing parents and children procedural safeguards, including a
guarantee that parents be allowed to attend all meetings concern-
ing, inter alia, the “educational placement of the child, and the pro-
vision of a free appropriate public education to such child.”90
The development of an IEP is supposed to be a collaborative
process with a temporal element, within statutorily specified pa-
rameters.91 Participants in the IEP development process must in-
clude the child’s parents, at least one “regular education teacher”
of the child, one special education teacher of the child, and a rep-
resentative of the local educational agency, such as the school dis-
trict.92 The district’s representative must have supervisory authority
in regard to special education, must be knowledgeable about the
general curriculum, and must have knowledge of the available re-
sources. One member of the team must be able to interpret the
“instructional implications of evaluation results.”93 Significantly, a
sufficient IEP must be in effect by the beginning of the school
year.94 In New York, IEP teams are called the “committee on spe-
cial education,” or CSE.95
Neither the IDEA nor its predecessor statute, the EAHCA, in-
clude language defining an “appropriate” education. Instead, this
issue has been decided by the courts. In the seminal case of Board
of Education of Hendrick Hudson Center School District v. Rowley,96 the
90 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1).
91 See Chopp, supra note 4, at 424.
92 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i)–(vi); 34 C.F.R. § 300.321(a) (2007); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.2. Inclusion of the child at the IEP development meet-
ing is discretionary. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(B)(vii). However, one year before the child
attains the age of majority, the child must be informed of his or her rights under the
IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(VII)(cc). Moreover, if the purpose of an IEP meet-
ing is to discuss transition goals, the child must be invited. 34 C.F.R. § 300.321(b).
93 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(v) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.321(a)(5).
94 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A).
95 See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4402.1.b.(1) (McKinney 2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 8, § 200.1(k).
96 458 U.S. 176 (1982) (decided under the Education of the Handicapped Act).
Amy Rowley was a hearing impaired child who was enrolled in mainstream education.
Asserting the need for an in-class interpreter, her parents initiated an impartial hear-
ing and did not prevail at the administrative level. Id. at 185. The district court, how-
ever, found that the disability was interfering with Amy’s education. They looked to
whether there was a disparity between the child’s level of performance as compared
to her potential. Id. at 185–86. The Second Circuit affirmed by a split panel. Id. at 186.
Certiorari was granted specifically so that the Supreme Court could examine the sub-
stantive confines of a FAPE. The Supreme Court held that Amy had been provided
with an appropriate education since she was provided with “personalized instruction
and related services” meeting her personal needs and permitting her to advance from
grade to grade. Id. at 209–10. Justice Blackmun’s concurrence agreed that Amy had
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Supreme Court provided guidance on the issue. After extensive ex-
amination of the legislative history, the Court, in a decision by Jus-
tice Rehnquist, found that the term “appropriate” did not require
maximization of each child’s potential. In fact, equal educational
opportunity was rejected as an unworkable standard.97 The stan-
dard set was minimal, relying on legislative history indicating that
FAPE was to provide a “basic floor of opportunity” and that attain-
ing grades sufficient to advance generally is indicative of “educa-
tional benefit.”98 However, the Court stated that the education
must be personalized, provide supports and services, and “must
comport with the child’s IEP.”99 Qualitatively, the Court concluded
that the education must enable the child to make progress and not
induce regression.100
States must establish procedures for parents to contest “any
matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate pub-
lic education to such child,”101 with a two year limitations period.102
There are ample opportunities for parents and school districts to
resolve their differences before relief is pursued through the ad-
ministrative process. Under the IDEA, a parent who rejects the IEP
and wishes to enroll their child in a private school must provide
ten days’ notice prior to the withdrawal, to which the school district
may respond.103
been provided with a FAPE through an IEP permitting her educational opportunity
but argued for a strict standard affording greater deference to the administrative
hearing officers. Id. at 210–12 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The dissent of Justices
White, Brennan and Marshall argued that the statute’s objective was to provide “full
educational opportunity” and noted that, without a sign language interpreter, Amy
comprehended “less than half of what [was] said in the classroom – less than half of
what normal children comprehend. This is hardly an equal opportunity to learn, even
if Amy makes passing grades.” Id. at 213–16 (White, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 198–200.
98 Justice White’s dissent, which was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, as-
serts that the “basic floor of opportunity” contemplated by Congress was one that
eliminated “the effects of the handicap” to the extent possible. Id. at 215 (White, J.,
dissenting). States are permitted to adopt a higher standard. The Massachusetts stan-
dard is an education that assures maximum development. Roland M. v. Concord Sch.
Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 987 (1st Cir. 1990); Stock v. Mass. Hosp. Sch., 392 Mass. 205,
211 (1984).
99 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202–03.
100 Id. at 203–04.
101 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (2012). See also N.Y. EDUC. Law § 4404.1 (McKinney
2007).
102 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B). See also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8,
§ 200.5(j)(1) (2013).
103 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(10)(C)(iii). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.148 (2007); Sch.
Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369–70 (1985); Flo-
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New York has established a two-tiered administrative hearing
process along the continuum embraced by the IDEA; parents may
file an administrative complaint104 “with respect to any matter relat-
ing to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a
student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disabil-
ity, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such
student.”105 A thirty-day resolution period follows.106 If the dispute
is not resolved during that time, an impartial hearing is held
before a hearing officer and mediation is available as an alterna-
tive.107 At the hearing, witnesses testify under oath and other evi-
dence may also be received.108 In New York, “any party aggrieved”
by the Impartial Hearing Officer’s decision may appeal to the State
Review Officer (SRO).109 The SRO’s review is based upon the ap-
pellate pleadings and the impartial hearing record and the SRO
may ask the parties to present oral argument or additional evi-
dence beyond the impartial hearing record.110 The decisions of the
State Review Officer are appealable to either New York State Su-
preme Court or federal district court.111
School Committee of the Town of Burlington  v. Department of Educa-
tion of Massachusetts112 established the standard for determining
whether a parent who rejects an IEP and unilaterally places their
child in private school is entitled to tuition reimbursement. In Bur-
lington, the Supreme Court held that courts have the latitude to
award tuition reimbursement “where a court determines that a pri-
vate placement desired  by the parents was proper under the Act
and that an IEP calling for placement in a public school was inap-
propriate.”113 The Court also stated “equitable considerations are
rence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12–13 (1993); M.C. ex rel. v.
Voluntown, 226 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2000).
104 The complaint is called a “due process complaint” and the proceeding is re-
ferred to as an “impartial due process hearing” or an “impartial hearing.” N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8 § 200.5(i), (j)–(k).
105 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404.1 (McKinney 2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8,
§ 200.5(i)(1).
106 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404.1; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.5(j)(2)(v).
107 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.5(j)(3)(iii).
Mediation is voluntary and cannot be used to deny or delay a due process hearing. Id.
§ 200.5(h)(1)(i)-(ii).
108 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.5 (j)(3)(xii)(c).
109 Id. § 200.5(k)(1). See also N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404.2.
110 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, §§ 279.9–279.10.
111 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404.3-a; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, §§ 279.9–279.10.
See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2012) (conferring the right to appeal the adminis-
trative decision through a civil suit in state or federal court).
112 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
113 Id. at 370, 373–74.
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relevant in fashioning appropriate relief.”114 Subsequently, this de-
cision gave rise to the three-pronged Burlington test, which consid-
ers: (1) whether the school district offered an appropriate program
in the IEP; (2) whether the alternative selected by the parents was
appropriate; and (3) whether the equities favor the parents.115
The IDEA provides that if a parent enrolls their child in a pri-
vate school without consent from a public agency, then
a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse
the parents for the cost of that enrollment if the court or hear-
ing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropri-
ate public education available to the child in a timely manner
prior to that enrollment.116
Reimbursement may be “reduced or denied” if the parent fails
to object to the education offered in the IEP at the IEP formula-
tion meeting or fails to provide written notice of the basis for their
objections to the IEP within ten business days prior to enrolling
their child in a private school.117 Reimbursement of private school
tuition may also be reduced or denied if the parent has been noti-
fied that the district intends to evaluate the child or “upon a judi-
cial finding of unreasonableness with respect to actions taken by
the parents.”118 The initial inquiry, however, is always whether the
public educational authority offered a FAPE in the first instance.
Where a child has been identified as having a qualifying disa-
bility, the logical starting point of the determination of whether a
FAPE has been offered should be the IEP. However, as reflected in
the R.E. case, school districts have been known to offer testimony
about how a child might be provided with services not reflected
within the IEP document.119 R.E. purports to resolve the issue of
whether the determination is restricted to the information con-
114 Id. at 374.
115 Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12–13 (1993); Walczak v.
Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 1998). See also Forest Grove
Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 237–38 (2009); R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d
167, 185 (2d Cir. 2012). In addition, the statute provides that, after consideration of
“a preponderance of the evidence” a court “shall grant such relief as it determines is
appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).
116 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). This is so even if the student was never classified
as disabled under the IDEA nor received special education services in the public
school. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 557 U.S. at 237–39 (citing Burlington in noting that
parents are entitled to tuition reimbursement where they had provided school district
with independent evaluations and the school district’s refusal to provide an IEP de-
prived plaintiff of a FAPE).
117 20 U.S.C. § 1412(10)(C)(iii)(I)(aa)–(bb).
118 20 U.S.C. § 1412(10)(C)(iii)(II)–(III).
119 R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 186 (2d Cir. 2012).
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tained within the four corners of the IEP document only.120
III. R.E. V. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION: DISCUSSION
R.E. is comprised of three companion cases brought by par-
ents of autistic children. All three cases were ultimately appealed to
the Second Circuit. In each case, the plaintiff parents claimed that
the IEPs created by the New York City Department of Education
(DOE) were deficient and failed to offer all of the services neces-
sary to meet the complainant children’s educational needs. Instead
of placing their children in public schools, the plaintiff parents
opted, providing the requisite notice, to place them in private
schools.121 Each of the children involved attended private schools
specializing in working with autistic children. The cost of providing
specialized education is extremely high, and some tuitions ran into
six figures.122 Parents of these children challenged the IEPs in ad-
ministrative hearings, claiming that they did not comply with the
IDEA’s requirements of offering a FAPE. The DOE offered testi-
mony explaining how the children’s needs would have been met,
even though the services described in the verbal testimony did not
appear in the written IEPs.
A. Facts and Procedural History of the Companion Cases
At issue in the lead case was the IEP developed for the
2008–2009 school year for J.E., an autistic child. The challenged
IEP offered placement in a 6:1:1 special class and a full-time, be-
havior-management paraprofessional, as well as two 30-minute ses-
120 Id. at 185.
121 Id. at 175–84. New York City has a bifurcated IEP development and school
placement process. In addition to parents, IEP development teams include adminis-
trators responsible for the various zones within the DOE’s purview in addition to the
other required IEP team members. See Who Attends the IEP Team Meeting, N.Y.C. DEP’T
OF EDUC., http://schools.nyc.gov/Academics/SpecialEducation/SEP/meeting/who
attends.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). After the IEP has been developed and pro-
vided to the parent, a separate document called a Final Notice of Recommendation
(FNR) is mailed to the parent. The FNR identifies the school that the DOE proposes
the child attend and where both education and related services will be delivered. See
Final Notice of Recommendation (FNR), N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://schools.nyc.gov/
Academics/SpecialEducation/SEP/determination/fnr.html (last visited Nov. 5,
2013).
122 See R.E. and M.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 785 F. Supp. 2d 28, 37 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (noting that tuition at issue was $104,167 for a ten-month program and
$125,000 for a twelve-month program); see also R.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 09-
CV-4478 (KAM), 2011 WL 1131492, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 1, 2011) (noting that full
tuition at the private program at issue was $85,000).
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sions of group counseling each week with the following related
services: five 30-minute individual sessions of speech therapy and
five 30-minute occupational therapy sessions.123 R.E. and M.E. re-
jected the IEP and enrolled their son in a private school, Mc-
Carton, specializing in teaching children with autism.124 The
parents notified the DOE that they objected to the offered pro-
gram and placement because it did not provide the necessary 1:1
teaching instruction or sufficient speech therapy,125 and that J.E.
was being reenrolled in McCarton.126
J.E.’s parents initiated an impartial hearing, which was held in
March of 2009. The special education teacher from J.E.’s proposed
classroom testified about methodologies used in his classroom.127
123 R.E and M.E., 785 F. Supp. 2d at 35–36. The IEP was formulated by considera-
tion of reports from McCarton and a report of an observation of J.E. made by the
DOE at McCarton. Id. at 35.
124 Id. at 37. J.E.’s IEP for 2007–2008 offered placement in a 6:1:1 classroom in a
special public school. The DOE conceded that the 2007–2008 placement was inappro-
priate, and J.E. was enrolled in McCarton for the 2007–2008 school year. See id. at 35.
A 6:1:1 class has six students, one teacher and one paraprofessional. These classes
serve students who are “ aggressive, self-abusive or extremely withdrawn and with se-
vere difficulties in the acquisition and generalization of language and social skill de-
velopment. These students require very intense structured individual programming
[and] continual adult supervision.” Description of Class Staffing Ratios, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF
EDUC., http://schools.nyc.gov/documents/d75/district/staffing_ratios.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 5, 2013). Paraprofessionals assist in classrooms for children with emotional,
cognitive, and/or physical handicaps, autism, and other special needs. They assist
with teaching under a teacher’s direction, but otherwise function primarily as aides.
Qualifications are minimal. Only a high school diploma or its equivalent, like a GED,
is required. Paraprofessionals must pass the New York State Assessment of Teaching
Skills exam and take a three-hour online paraprofessional training course given by
the New York City Department of Education. See Substitute Paraprofessionals, N.Y.C.
DEP’T OF EDUC., http://schools.nyc.gov/Careers/SubPara (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
125 R.E. and M.E., 785 F. Supp. 2d at 36–37.
126 R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 2012). J.E.’s class at
McCarton had five children and a 1:1 student/teacher ratio. J.E. received about thirty
hours of applied behavior analysis (ABA) therapy, plus five 60-minute individual
speech therapy and language sessions weekly and individual occupational therapy for
45 minutes, five times weekly, in addition to three afterschool sessions for reinforce-
ment. Id. at 175–76. See also R.E. and M.E., 785 F. Supp. 2d at 34.
127 R.E. and M.E., 785 F. Supp. 2d at 36. The teacher testified that he used
TEACCH, ABA and DIR, but that he was not certified or formally trained in those
methodologies. DIR stands for “developmental,” “individual differences,” and “rela-
tionship based.” DIR is a trademarked methodology addressing social, emotional, and
intellectual capacity. What is DIR Floortime?, THE INTERDISCIPLINARY COUNCIL ON DEVEL-
OPMENTAL AND LEARNING DISORDERS, http://www.icdl.com/DIRFloortime.shtml (last
visited Nov. 5, 2013). ABA therapy teaches behaviors by establishing goals and provid-
ing constant reinforcement. The parent is an essential part of the program and must
be trained to reinforce lessons. See What Is ABA Therapy?, APPLIED BEHAVIOR STRATE-
GIES, http://appliedbehavioralstrategies.com/basics-of-aba.html (last visited Nov. 5,
2013); see also R.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 09-CV-4478 (KAM), 2011 WL
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The IHO found in favor of the parents.128 The DOE appealed to
the SRO,129 who reversed and denied reimbursement, determining
instead that the 6:1:1 class was appropriate.130 The parents ap-
pealed and the district court reversed the SRO.
The district court held that the DOE had failed to offer a
FAPE in the first instance and that the SRO erred in relying on
“after-the-fact testimony of . . . what the teacher . . . would have
done if J.E. had attended his class.”131 The district court noted “the
only information the parents can rely upon as determining
whether the proposed program is appropriate for their child is the
IEP document itself.”132 The district court concluded that the SRO
improperly relied on the teacher’s testimony “to remedy deficits
found by the IHO in the IEP.”133
The second plaintiff, R.K., was entering kindergarten in
2008–2009. The CSE meeting held to develop her IEP for the
2008–2009 school year was contentious and resulted in an IEP of-
fering placement in a 6:1:1 class.134 At the CSE meeting, R.K.’s par-
1131492, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 1, 2011) (“ABA methodology is frequently 1:1 in nature,
and is inherently individualized, as the instructor or therapist assesses the particular
child’s behavior; breaks desired skills down into small, discrete steps; and reinforces
positive behavior according to the needs and progress of that child. ABA is extremely
intensive, often involving 25 to 40 hours of effort per week.”). TEACHH stands for
Training and Education of Autistic and Related Communication Handicapped Chil-
dren and uses visual supports to help autistic students to communicate in highly struc-
tured environments in class or at home. See Training and Education of Autistic and
Related Communication Handicapped Children (TEACCH), AUTISM SPEAKS, http://www
.autismspeaks.org/what-autism/treatment/training-and-education-autistic-and-rela
ted-communication-handicapped-children (last visited Dec. 8, 2013). Martin Kotler
explains that the approach used to teach impaired students either presumes that their
abilities are fixed, which he characterizes as passive-acceptant, or can seek to modify
and improve their function. A passive-acceptant approach does not admit the possibil-
ity of improvement and, in Kotler’s view, is simply another form of exclusion. In con-
trast, the “active-modificational approach” permits the possibility of functional
improvement. Kotler, supra note 4, at 333–38, 348–50. TEACCH ultimately seeks to
“teach autistic children skills sufficient to avoid institutionalization.” Id. at 334. Dr. O.
Ivar Lovaas’s behavioral approach (ABA), for its part, was so successful that many of
the children he studied were fully integrated into public schools. Id. at 334–35.
128 R.E. and M.E., 785 F. Supp.2d at 38. Among other things, the IHO found that
the program offered by the DOE was not appropriate. Id. at 37; R.E., 694 F.3d at 177.
129 New York law provides for appeal to a State Review Officer from an adverse
impartial hearing officer’s decision by either party. See N.Y. COMP. CODES & REGS. tit.
8, § 200.5(k)(1) (2013)
130 R.E., 694 F.3d at 177.
131 R.E. and M.E., 785 F. Supp. 2d at 41.
132 Id. at 41–42.
133 Id. at 42.
134 R.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 09-CV-4478 (KAM), 2011 WL 1131492, at *2,
*7–8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 1, 2011). The CSE considered evaluations performed in late 2007
and early 2008 by a DOE psychologist and R.K’s service providers, all of which con-
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ents had objected to the 6:1:1 placement, asserting that a private
evaluation from the McCarton Center recommended 1:1 atten-
tion.135 The IEP noted R.K.’s need for constant supervision, but a
Functional Behavioral Assessment (FBA) was not performed nor
was a behavioral intervention plan (BIP) developed for inclusion in
the IEP.136 Nor did the IEP specify provision of parent training.137
The parents objected to a lack of an FBA, a BIP or provision of
parent training in the IEP.138 They rejected the IEP as insufficient,
enrolled their child at Brooklyn Autism Center (BAC) and initi-
ated a due process hearing seeking tuition reimbursement.139
cluded that R.K.’s extreme inattentiveness required a year-round, highly structured,
specialized program with individualized attention and individualized occupational
therapy and speech and language therapy sessions each week. Id. at *5–7. See also
supra text accompanying note 124, which describes a 6:1:1 class.
135 See R.E. 694 F.3d at 179; R.K., 2011 WL 1131492, at *7 (“The McCarton Report
recommended, among other things, ongoing intervention 12 months per year, 7 days
a week, in an ABA-based program, with 40 hours of 1:1 ABA therapy weekly, including
15 hours at home; ‘manding’ sessions within each ABA teaching session; [occupa-
tional therapy] and speech and language therapy, 60 minutes each, five times a week;
and two hours of parent training per week.”).
136 R.K., 2011 WL 1131492, at *8. A “functional behavioral assessment means the
process of determining why a student engages in behaviors that impede learning and
how the student’s behavior relates to the environment.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 8, § 200.1(r) (2013). New York regulations prescribe the methodology for con-
ducting the assessment and specifies that the assessment should identify a baseline of
the student’s problem behaviors with regard to frequency, duration, intensity and/or
latency across activities, settings, people and times of the day” and must permit formu-
lation of a behavioral intervention plan. Id. § 200.22(a)(3). The code defines a behav-
ioral intervention plan as a plan based upon an FBA that “at a minimum includes a
description of the problem behavior, global and specific hypotheses as to why the
problem behavior occurs and intervention strategies that include positive behavioral
supports and services to address the behavior.” Id. § 200.1(mmm).
137 The NYCRR states that “parent counseling and training means assisting parents
in understanding the special needs of their child; providing parents with information
about child development; and helping parents to acquire the necessary skills that will
allow them to support the implementation of their child’s individualized education
program.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.1(kk). To the extent that parent
training is provided, it must be specified in the IEP. Id. § 200.4(d)(2)(v)(b)(5). Par-
ent training must be provided for parents of autistic children. Id. § 200.13(d) (“Provi-
sion shall be made for parent counseling and training . . . for the purpose of enabling
parents to perform appropriate follow-up intervention activities at home.”).
138 R.K., 2011 WL 1131492, at *8. The IEP noted that R.K. engaged in self-stimula-
tion, which interfered with her attention and social interaction, but concluded that
her behavior could be addressed by the classroom teacher. See R.E., 694 F.3d at 179.
139 R.K., 2011 WL 1131492, at *1. Among other things, the parents claimed that the
IEP’s contents were deficient because the DOE failed to perform an FBA for develop-
ment of a BIP; that mandated services of parent counseling, parent training, and
speech and language therapy were either missing or insufficient; and that the 6:1:1
class ratio would not provide sufficient individualized attention. Id. at *8, 14–25. BAC
is a school with five teachers serving four students using 1:1 ABA instruction; the
school has students rotate among the teachers every thirty minutes and seeks to de-
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At the impartial hearing, the DOE offered testimony of R.K.’s
proposed public school teacher. She testified about her teaching
methodologies, how she would have provided attention to R.K.,
and how the speech and language therapy would be supplemented
through daily classroom instruction.140 The public school’s parent
coordinator testified that the school provided referrals to outside
agencies, occasional workshops, and parent training on request.141
The IHO ruled in favor of the parents, holding that the IEP was
insufficient.142
The DOE appealed and the SRO reversed, relying on the DOE
testimony in the record of the impartial hearing to cure deficien-
cies in the IEP in regard to formulation of a BIP and provision of
speech and language services.143 Relying on hearing testimony of
the school’s parent coordinator about the availability of parent
training services, the SRO determined that failure to list parent
training and counseling as a related service in the IEP was immate-
rial.144 Tuition reimbursement was denied completely, and the par-
ents appealed to the district court.
The district court reversed the SRO’s decision, granting sum-
mary judgment to the parents.145 Significantly, the district court
opined that DOE testimony could not cure deficiencies in the
IEP.146 The district court rejected the SRO’s conclusion that R.K.’s
behavior did not interfere with learning and criticized reliance
velop “self-care, language skills, socialization, play skills, and pragmatic language.” Id.
at *9. Parents are required to come to the school for at least two hours monthly for
training. Id. The DOE refused to consider BAC as a possible placement. Id.
140 The teacher had never observed ABA teaching methods and used a different
method called TEACHH. See R.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 09-CV-4478 (KAM),
2011 WL 1131492, at *2, *9 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 1, 2011); R.E., 694 F.3d at 180.
141 R.K., 2011 WL 1131492, at *10. Additionally, the parent coordinator testified
that no home visits were provided. Id.
142 The IHO only awarded partial tuition reimbursement, however, computed by
awarding only that part of the tuition covering the shortfall between the amount of
1:1 ABA therapy offered by the DOE and the amount of 1:1 ABA therapy provided by
the private school. The parents were awarded $32,400. BAC’s full tuition was $90,000.
R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 180 (2d Cir. 2012); R.K., 2011 WL
1131492, at *11.
143 R.E., 694 F.3d at 180–81.
144 R.K., 2011 WL 1131492, at *21. New York law requires that parent training be
included as part of an educational program for autistic students. “Parent counseling
and training means assisting parents in understanding the special needs of their
child; providing parents with information about child development; and helping par-
ents to acquire the necessary skills that will allow them to support the implementation
of their child’s individualized education program.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
8, § 200.1(kk) (2013).
145 R.K., 2011 WL 1131492, at *30; R.E., 694 F.3d at 181.
146 R.K., 2011 WL 1131492, at *2, *30; R.E., 694 F.3d at 181.
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upon the teacher’s prospective testimony of how she would have
developed a BIP once the child was in her classroom.147 Nor could
failure to identify parent training as a related service in the IEP be
cured by DOE testimony about the availability of services at the
proposed school.148 The district court further held that the SRO
erred in relying on testimony about classroom activities targeting
speech and language skills to make up for deficient provisions for
speech and language therapy in the IEP.149 The court found that
the hearing evidence supported a finding that a 6:1:1 class would
not afford the attention R.K. required.150 The district court con-
cluded that the compounded omissions in the IEP constituted a
denial of a FAPE and awarded tuition reimbursement.151
Like the two other plaintiffs, the third plaintiff, E. Z.-L., was
autistic and enrolled in a specialized private school. E. Z.-L.’s
mother rejected the 2008–2009 IEP and offered placement in writ-
ing, stating her intent to enroll E. Z.-L. in The Rebecca School and
to seek tuition reimbursement.152 The parents then filed an Impar-
tial Hearing request.153
The issues in E. Z.-L’s case, however, differed slightly from the
companion cases. E. Z.-L. challenged the ability of the offered
placement to implement the IEP and the failure to comply with
New York regulations mandating conduct of an FBA in order to
formulate a BIP.154 The IHO found that E. Z.-L. was denied a FAPE
147 R.K., 2011 WL 1131492, at *17–20; R.E., 694 F.3d at 181.
148 R.K., 2011 WL 1131492, at *20–21.
149 Id. at *21.
150 Id. at *22.
151 Id. at *2, *21–22, *30. The district court also noted that the speech and lan-
guage instruction incorporated into classroom instruction was insufficient because it
was not individualized. Id. at *21–22.
152 The IEP offered placement in a 6:1:1 special class with four 30-minute sessions
of individualized occupational therapy, three 30-minute sessions of individualized
speech-language therapy, one 30-minute session of 3:1 speech-language therapy, one
30-minute session of individualized counseling and one 30–minute session of 2:1
group counseling. E. Z.-L. ex rel. R.L. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 763 F. Supp. 2d 584,
590 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
153 R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167,182–83 (2d Cir. 2012). E. Z.-L’s hear-
ing was held between September 2008 and January 2009. DOE special education
teacher, Feng Ye, who had participated in the CSE, and Susan Cruz, the assistant
principal at the public school location offered to E. Z.-L., testified. Ye explained the
CSE’s conclusion that E. Z.-L’s behavioral issues did not interfere with learning and
Cruz testified about the programs and services that would be available at the prof-
fered school. Id. at 183–85
154 New York regulations predicate formulation of a behavioral intervention plan
upon a functional behavioral assessment. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.22
(2013).
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and awarded tuition reimbursement.155 The DOE appealed to the
SRO, who reversed the IHO’s decision.156 E. Z.-L.’s parents ap-
pealed to the district court, which affirmed the SRO’s finding that
the CSE team properly determined that E. Z.-L.’s behaviors did not
interfere with learning and had properly integrated management
strategies into the IEP.157
B. The Second Circuit’s Treatment of Each Case
The Second Circuit arrived at different results in each of the
three cases. As to J.E., the Second Circuit determined, in essence,
that the SRO had reached the right conclusion for the wrong rea-
son; though he relied on improper testimony, the SRO properly
found that the record did not support the parent’s claim that J.E.
required 1:1 teacher support.158 In R.K., the Second Circuit af-
firmed the district court’s decision that R.K. was denied a FAPE.
The Second Circuit concluded that the SRO had erred in relying
on testimony of what would have been provided to R.K. in the class-
room, rather than the written contents of the IEP, and the Second
Circuit reinstated the reimbursement award.159 The Second Circuit
held that E. Z.-L. had been afforded a FAPE, but also distinguished
her claims.160
Addressing the overarching evidentiary issues, the DOE ar-
gued before the Second Circuit that, as a general matter, an IEP
155 R.E., 694 F.3d at 183.The basis of the IHO’s decision was the failure to comply
with the procedural requirements relative to the formulation of a BIP, failure to pro-
vide parent training or to provide for a transition plan to help the child change
schools. The IHO further found that the private school and after-school programs
selected by the parents were appropriate. E. Z.-L., 763 F. Supp. 2d at 592–93.
156 R.E., 694 F.3d at 183. The Second Circuit stated that the proposed classroom
teacher had testified that neither the FBA nor the BIP were necessary. Id.
157 Id. at 184. Additionally, the court held that parent training was provided on an
as-needed basis and that lack of a transition plan was not fatal. E. Z.-L., 763 F. Supp.
2d at 596–98.
158 R.E., 694 F.3d at 192–93. The Second Circuit also addressed the issue of the
degree of deference that should be accorded to administrative decisions. Id. at 192.
That discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.
159 Id. at 194. The Second Circuit likewise held that reliance on the prospective
teacher’s testimony that a BIP would have been created once R.K. was enrolled in the
class contributed to the deficiencies that cumulatively denied R.K. a FAPE, stating that
“failure to conduct an FBA is a particularly serious procedural violation for a student
who has significant interfering behaviors.” Id. at 193–94.
160 Id. at 195. E. Z.-L.’s claims were that the IEP could not be implemented and that
failure to comply with procedures requiring an FBA to formulate a BIP amounted to a
denial of a FAPE. The Second Circuit held that the IEP was substantively sufficient
and that the implementation claim was speculative. The court further determined
that, since testimony established that the child’s behaviors did not interfere with
learning, there was no need for an FBA and thus no procedural violation. Id.
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should not be the sole benchmark in measuring whether the Dis-
trict had fulfilled its obligations under IDEA’s substantive stan-
dards.161 Instead, the DOE contended that testimony about what
the child “would have received” in a public school setting, includ-
ing testimony about services or accommodations not identified in
the IEP, should be considered. The plaintiffs urged enunciation of
a “four corners” rule, which would have limited the court’s deter-
mination of IDEA compliance exclusively to examination of the
sufficiency of the terms of the IEP. The court struck a balance, ad-
hering to a middle ground:
[W]e hold that testimony regarding state-offered services may
only explain or justify what is listed in the written IEP. Testi-
mony may not support a modification that is materially different
from the IEP, and thus a deficient IEP may not be effectively
rehabilitated or amended after the fact through testimony re-
garding services that do not appear in the IEP.162
The court was influenced by cases from the Ninth, Third, and
First Circuits, all of which dealt with the issue of whether a child’s
progress or lack of progress may be considered in determining
whether an IEP afforded a FAPE and concluded that past or pre-
sent progress was irrelevant to the determination.163 The Second
Circuit found in these three cases a temporal dimension to the de-
termination of an IEP’s sufficiency, calling for examination of an
IEP solely by reference to conditions known at the time the IEP was
created.164 Additionally, the court noted a trend of rejecting retro-
161 See R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 185 (2d Cir. 2012).
162 Id.
163 Id. at 186. None of the three cited cases involved testimony about services that
weren’t listed in a child’s IEP. Instead, they all dealt with the issue of whether a child’s
progress or lack of progress may be considered in determining whether an IEP af-
forded a FAPE and all three cases held that past or present progress were irrelevant to
the determination. See Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting
that an individualized educational program should be examined to see whether it was
sufficient at the time it was written, and that progress or provision of supplemental
private services are irrelevant to the determination); Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62
F.3d 520, 530 (3d Cir. 1995) (ruling that appropriateness of an IEP is determined
prospectively, such that any lack of progress on the part of the child has no bearing
on the sufficiency of the IEP); Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 992
(1st Cir. 1990) (noting that neither lack of progress under previous, identical IEP nor
subsequent improvement at a private school permit an inference that the program
offered in the IEP was insufficient). The First Circuit further noted: “An IEP is a
snapshot, not a retrospective. In striving for ‘appropriateness,’ an IEP must take into
account what was, and was not, objectively reasonable when the snapshot was taken,
that is, at the time the IEP was promulgated.” Id.
164 R.E., 694 F.3d at 185–86.
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spective testimony in the Second Circuit’s district courts.165
Though the court declined to adopt a strict four-corners test, it
nonetheless found in these cases a limitation permitting examina-
tion of the IEP document in determining whether a FAPE had
been offered. Thus, the core holding of the R.E. decision is that
“retrospective evidence” materially altering an IEP is not
permissible.166
The court properly acknowledged the centrality of the IEP. It
noted that the IEP is the primary factor upon which parents base
their decisions to enroll their child in a private or public pro-
gram.167 By barring testimony about delivery of services not in-
cluded in the IEP, the decision promotes fairness in the IEP
formulation process, admonishing districts not to engage in “bait
and switch” tactics. However, application of the rule to each of the
cases serves as a cautionary tale to parents and their attorneys to
provide a clear record establishing their child’s educational needs
and that those needs have not been sufficiently met by the child’s
IEP.168
165 See R.E. and M.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 785 F. Supp. 2d 28, 37 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); R.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 09-CV-4478 (KAM), 2011 WL 1131492, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 1, 2011); Antonaccio v. Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 2d 710, 724 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); J.R. v. Board of Educ. of Rye Sch. Dist., 345 F. Supp. 2d 386, 395 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (“[W]e therefore must not engage in Monday-morning quarterbacking guided
by our knowledge of S.R.’s subsequent progress at Eagle Hill, but rather consider the
propriety of the IEP with respect to the likelihood that it would benefit S.R. at the
time it was devised.”).
166 R.E., 694 F.3d at 188. Testimony from the proposed classroom teachers was
deemed unreliable to justify the programs and services contained in an IEP, since
placement with a particular teacher cannot be guaranteed at the time an IEP is
drafted. Id. at 187.
167 Id. at 188.
168 Despite the correct result in this core holding, the R.E. court improperly stated
that good-faith IEP errors and omissions could be remedied during the thirty-day
resolution period that follows after a parent has filed a due process complaint, as
required by 20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(1)(B). See R.E., 694 F.3d at 188. Permitting reforma-
tion of an otherwise deficient IEP—all under the guise of good faith—would be as
improper as permitting the after-the-fact testimony barred by the R.E. decision. A
motion for rehearing en banc on this issue was supported by an amicus brief filed by
Partnership for Children’s Rights, The Legal Aid Society, Advocates for Children of
New York, New York Legal Assistance Group, Queens Legal Services, Legal Services
NYC-Bronx, and Southern Bronx Legal Services. The amici argued that
the resolution period exception carved out by the panel’s decision con-
travenes the timeliness element of the IDEA’s FAPE requirement and
could be read to effect a new FAPE standard for private school tuition
cases: FAPE may be offered either through an appropriate IEP prepared
prior to the start of the school year (and prior to the student’s enroll-
ment in the private school) or through an IEP later modified to remedy
the deficiencies, as long as the IEP modifications are made during the
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Why the Language of the IEP Should Control
Valid and important policy objectives are well served by a strict
standard limiting resolution of FAPE disputes to examination of
the written IEP. In disputes over IEP sufficiency, the initial issue is
whether the school district afforded a FAPE.169 The only evidence
relevant to a district’s claim that its IEP offered a FAPE is evidence
showing that, at the time it was drafted, the IEP provided the ser-
vices and supports necessary to enable a child to make progress.
Thus, a sound rule would limit the evidence to the IEP document
and testimony justifying or refuting whether the IEP components
would promote the child’s progress.170 This, in fact, is the rule that
was announced in R.E. and it is the correct result. A restrictive rule
promotes the normative values of the IDEA to protect the less pow-
erful party, the parents, giving primacy to the actual IEP in deter-
mining whether school districts have complied with the IDEA
mandates.
Three cases cited by the R.E. court as decisions disfavoring
consideration of retrospective evidence were not particularly re-
cent. Adams v. Oregon,171 Carlisle Area School v. Scott P.,172 and Roland
M. v. Concord School Committee,173—from the Ninth, Third, and First
Circuits, respectively—emphasized that the IEP should be ex-
amined by reference to conditions existing at the time of develop-
ment only. The Roland M. court stated the standard clearly:
30-day resolution period following the filing of the paren’s [sic] due
process complaint.
Brief for Partnership for Children’s Rights et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-
Appellants, R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 11-1266-
cv, 11-1474-cv, 11-655-cv), 2012 WL 4901037, at *6. This would allow a school district
to reform an IEP in the context of litigation. Additionally, permitting reformation
during the resolution period ignores the fact that the IDEA gives parents two years to
assert their claims and would thus permit reformation of an IEP for a school year that
might have already ended. Furthermore, 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(10(C)(iii) (2012) per-
mits reduction in the award of tuition to parents who fail to give their school district
advance notice of their intent to remove the child to a private school and give the
opportunity to cure. The en banc motion was denied in an unreported order dated
January 8, 2013. See R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 11-1266-cv (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 2013)
(denying petition for rehearing en banc).
169 See Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359 (1985); see
also supra note 115 (listing cases employing the three-prong Burlington test).
170 See R.E., 694 F.3d at 186–87.
171 195 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1999) (seeking reimbursement for privately secured
supplemental services).
172 62 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 1995) (seeking reimbursement of tuition for residential
private school).
173 910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1990) (seeking private school tuition reimbursement).
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An IEP is a snapshot, not a retrospective. In striving for “appro-
priateness,” an IEP must take into account what was, and was
not, objectively reasonable when the snapshot was taken, that is,
at the time the IEP was promulgated.174
Carlisle175 and Roland M.176 also noted that a student’s subse-
quent performance—either under an IEP or in a parent-selected
program—are likewise irrelevant in determining whether a dis-
puted IEP afforded a FAPE.177
More recent decisions have consistently held that the IEP doc-
ument is decisive in determining whether a student has been of-
fered an “appropriate” education, though none of these cases were
cited by the R.E. court. The Tenth,178 Fourth,179 and Sixth Cir-
cuits180 resolved the issue of whether a FAPE had been offered by
reference to the IEP only, even if the IEP was in draft form. Courts
have also rejected evidence of oral representations about services
that might have been provided but could not be considered in de-
termining whether the district had offered a FAPE.181 In fact, an
early Ninth Circuit case, Union School District v. Smith,182 held that
failure to identify in the IEP all of the services and programs being
offered was not excused by the school district’s presumption that
the parents would reject the IEP.183 The Union court explained that
the requirement of a written offer should be “rigorously enforced”
174 Id. at 992.
175 Carlisle, 62 F.3d at 520.
176 Roland M., 910 F.2d at 983.
177 See R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 188 (2d Cir. 2012).
178 Systema v. Academy Sch. Dist., 538 F.3d 1306, 1309 (10th Cir. 2008).
179 A.K. v. Alexandria Sch. Bd., 484 F.3d 672, 682 (4th Cir. 2007); Sch. Bd. of Hen-
rico v. Z.P., 399 F.3d 298, 306 n.5 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating services not included in the
written draft IEP that had been gratuitously provided could not be considered in
determining whether the student had been offered a FAPE).
180 Knable v. Bexley Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2001). All parties in that case
agreed that private school was appropriate but could not agree on which school
would be suitable. On the particular facts of that case, identification of the school was
deemed critical. Programs that were discussed but not incorporated into the IEP were
irrelevant to the issue of whether the district had offered a FAPE.
181 See, e.g., Clev. Heights, Univ. Heights S.D. v. Boss, 144 F.3d 391, 398 (6th Cir.
1998) (noting that a draft IEP was inadequate). Cf. Burlovich v. Bd. of Ed. of Lincoln
Consol. Sch., 208 F.3d 560, 568 (6th Cir. 2000) (rejecting parents’ argument that
verbal representations made by the district in a March meeting superseded written
offer contained in IEP drafted after a subsequent meeting in May; IEP and inquiry
was limited to subsequent written document in determining that a FAPE had been
offered).
182 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994).
183 Id. The school district claimed that it had omitted a particular program from
the IEP because it presumed the parents would reject the IEP. Claiming that they had
been deprived a FAPE, the parents did, in fact, reject the IEP, enrolled their child in
private school and successfully sued for tuition reimbursement.
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because it creates a record of “when placements were offered, what
placements were offered and what educational assistance was of-
fered to supplement a placement.”184 However, none of these cases
explicitly applied contract law tests to IEP disputes.
John M. v. Board of Education of Evanston Township185 did apply
“four-corners” language in determining whether a student had
been afforded a FAPE. The student at issue had received co-teach-
ing services at the middle school level that had not been expressly
provided for in the child’s IEP.186 District representatives main-
tained that co-teaching could not be provided in high school. The
parents sued, asserting that the “stay-put” provisions of the IDEA in
20 U.S.C. §1415(j) mandated provision of co-teaching at the high
school level.187 The court employed contract law terminology in its
analysis, stating that it would usually determine the sufficiency of
an IEP solely by examination of the information within “the four
corners of the document” and would permit extrinsic evidence if
the IEP was vague “with respect to how its goals are to be
achieved.”188
The John M. standard gives some protection to parents and
motivates school districts to exercise care in drafting IEPs. How-
ever, permitting an explanation of “intent” to explain ambiguity
opens the door to retrospective testimony rewriting an unclear IEP
document. Attempted reformation of an otherwise deficient IEP is
easy to envision. Consider, for example, the facts in R.K., where the
parents claimed that the IEP was insufficient because it did not
provide daily speech and language instruction. The DOE could
have argued that R.K.’s IEP was merely unclear and offered testi-
mony explaining that the intent was to provide daily speech and
184 Id.
185 502 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 2007).
186 See id. at 716–17. Integrated Co-Teaching (ICT), also known as Collaborative
Team Teaching (CTT) consists of a two-teacher team. One teacher is a general educa-
tion teacher and the other is a special education teacher. The class consists of both
general education and education aimed at students with disabilities. See Integrated Co-
Teaching (ICT), UNITED FED’N OF TEACHERS, http://www.uft.org/teaching/integrated-
co-teaching-collaborative-team-teaching-ctt (last visited Dec. 15, 2013). New York lim-
its the total number of students with disabilities that may be in the class. See N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.6(g)(1) (2013) (limit of twelve students with
disabilities in a CTT class).
187 See John M., 502 F.3d at 712–14. The IDEA’s “stay put” provisions require that a
child remain in the “same educational setting” pending the outcome of any proceed-
ings brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1415 when the status quo has changed, such as when
the child has progressed from one educational level to another. See id. at 714.
188 Id. at 715–16. The court allowed the possibility that, though not included in the
written document, co-teaching was an essential component to the IEP and remanded
for further consideration. Id. at 716–17.
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language instruction through classroom activities. A strict rule of
IEP construction would not create a hardship for school districts.
Instead, it would promote careful drafting practices. Returning to
the R.K. example, the school district could have included a state-
ment in the IEP reflecting the intent to provide supplemental
speech and language instruction through classwork, and the par-
ents would have been fully advised of the full scope of the offer.
Because the John M. rule has the potential to excuse omissions
and permit subsequent cure of IEP deficiencies after the fact, its
standard is not entirely satisfactory. In contrast, R.E. limits extrinsic
testimony to “explain or justify”189 the IEP’s written contents, but
not to correct or modify the document after the fact. Under R.E.,
the terms of the document properly drive the analysis. By permit-
ting IEP deficits to be explained away and gaps filled in by testi-
mony in post-IEP formulation challenges, congressional intent to
protect parents would be completely undermined.190
Parental structural due process rights, expressed through the
IEP document, were intended to be central to the policies pro-
moted by the IDEA.191 Strict rules of IEP construction serves those
the statute was designed to protect. Recognition of a “contractual-
ization”192 right and enforcement of this component of the IDEA’s
structural due process is essential to redress power inequities that
are anathema to the IDEA. Both John M. and R.E. attempted to
articulate rules consistent with these ideals but refused to charac-
terize the IEP as an agreement or a quasi-contract. In this respect,
both decisions fall short.193 By the same token, the judiciary is lim-
189 R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 185 (2d Cir. 2012).
190 See S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 12 (1975) (noting that “individualized planning con-
ferences are a way to provide parent involvement and protection to assure that appro-
priate services are provided to a handicapped child”); see also Brief for Partnership for
Children’s Rights et al., supra note 168. The resolution period following the filing of a
due process complaint is an improper time to modify an IEP. Parents and school
districts have the opportunity to settle differences before administrative process is
pursued and permitting reformation once litigation has been commenced invites ab-
surd results, especially if the due process hearing relates to a school year that has
already ended.
191 See Daniel, supra note 5, at 7.
192 See Romberg, supra note 2, at 421 (noting “contractualization” as a procedural
process for direct implementation).
193 The standard for determining whether failure to implement an IEP results in a
denial of a FAPE implicates the issue of whether contract law should be applied to
IDEA disputes. It is a significantly complex question that is tangential to this Article.
Others have discussed the issue at length, concluding that the IDEA acknowledges a
right to contractualization that carries with it a parental enforcement right. See Rom-
berg, supra note 2, at 419, 451–64. The IDEA, however, does not confer specific en-
forcement rights or establish standards for actionable breach. Instead, enforcement
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ited by the statutory language provided by Congress, and Congress
chose to call IEPs a “written statement,” rather than an agreement
or contract. The problem, therefore, lies with Congress and the
issue is whether the IDEA should be amended to reflect the cul-
tural construct that has developed over the past thirty years.
B. IEPs Are Quasi-Contractual
Notwithstanding legislative history explicitly stating that IEPs
are not to be considered contracts,194 scholars have expressed a
different view. Romberg suggests that the analogy of contract en-
forcement principles in the IDEA context is “compelling.”195 David
Neal and David L. Kirp have described the IEP as “a contract-like
document.”196 Part of the due process right conferred by the IDEA
is a right to a writing that is “in effect” a contract for “services and
placement” that the school district was otherwise not obligated to
provide.197
IEPs have significant contract-like qualities. Market-force qual-
ities are present; families compete for resources and some have
rights have been developed in litigation and there is no consistent standard. See
Brizuela, supra note 2, at 607–16. See also Ferster, supra note 8. Three standards have
been recognized. The substantial or significant failure standard was recognized in
Houston Independent School District v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2001) (re-
quiring more than de minimus implementation failures and finding fulfillment if sig-
nificant IEP provisions have been followed). A justifiable failure standard was applied
in Melissa S. v. School District of Pittsburgh, 183 F. App’x 184 (3d Cir. 2006) (school
district’s explanations sufficed to excuse failure to provide daily aide, even though
failure required child to stay home on occasion). This standard was rejected in
Manalansan Board. of Education v. Baltimore, No. Civ. 01–312–cv (AMD), 2001 WL
939699 (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2001). Finally, a materiality standard was applied in Van
Duyn v. Baker School District 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting argument
that an IEP contract should be construed against the school district drafter and hold-
ing that provision of education cannot “materially” differ from IEP provisions). Judge
Ferguson, however, wrote a forceful dissent in Van Duyn, admonishing that “judges
are not in a position to determine which parts of an agreed-upon IEP are or are not
material.” Id. at 827 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). Thus, articulation of contractualization
as part of the package of procedural rights conferred upon parents by the IDEA
would also provide consistency in the area of implementation disputes. See Romberg,
supra note 2, at 419.
194 Providing statutory remedies suggests that violations of an IEP are not to be
governed by contract law. Cf. S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 11 (1975) (noting how individual-
ized planning conferences were meant for the purpose of “developing, reviewing, and
when appropriate and with the agreement of the parents or guardian, revising a writ-
ten statement of appropriate educational services to be provided for each handi-
capped child”).
195 See Romberg, supra note 2, at 459.
196 David Neal & David L. Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered: The Case of
Special Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 66 (1985).
197 Id. at 71–73.
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greater resources to inform their negotiating positions.198 The pro-
cess of creating an IEP can take on the feel of a contractual negoti-
ation. IEPs have been described as “written offers” that parents may
or may not accept.199 As Daniela Caruso stated, “IEPs are as close to
contracts as it gets in the realm of public services governed by fed-
eral law.”200 Powerful parents—those with resources or experience
with the system—arguably exchange consideration with school dis-
tricts by forbearing suit in exchange for the educational setting
and related services they demand.201
There are differences, however. Whereas contract law permits
latitude in the form of an agreement,202 the IDEA requires that an
IEP must be written, be sufficient at the time of creation, and be in
effect by the beginning of the school year.203 Oral agreements are
not permitted by the IDEA and provision of a written offer is the
“centerpiece” of the statute and the negotiation stems from a “legal
right” rather than a free-market relationship.204 Moreover, the IEP
is part of an administrative process and reflects an individually de-
signed entitlement.205 Depending on the advocacy skills of the fam-
ily involved, the end result may or may not comprise a bargained-
for benefit.206 The subject of the IEP is pre-defined—an education
that is “appropriate.” Contract law does not concern itself with the
appropriateness of the contractual exchange, whereas “appropri-
ateness” of the bargained-for education is central to the examina-
tion of every IEP.
In contract law, the “four corners” rule comes into play only
when an agreement has been memorialized in writing and only
when the terms of that writing are unambiguous.207 A determina-
198 See Caruso, supra note 4, at 178–180; Chopp, supra note 4, at 429–30.
199 Knable v. Bexley Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 768 (6th Cir. 2001).
200 Caruso, supra note 4, at 177.
201 Id. at 179–80.
202 See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 3
(4th ed. 1998) (“The term ‘contract’ is . . . used by lay persons and lawyers alike to
refer to a document  in which the terms of a contract are written. The use of the word
in this sense is by no means improper so long as it is clearly understood that rules of
law utilizing the concept ‘contract’ rarely refer to the writing itself. Usually the refer-
ence is to the agreement; the writing being merely a memorial of the agreement.”).
203 20 U.S.C. §1414(d)(2)(A) (2012).
204 R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 188 (2d Cir. 2012); Knight, supra
note 2, at 378. See also Engel, supra note 4, at 168; Daniel, supra note 5, at 7–8.
205 R.E., 694 F.3d at 175.
206 See generally Caruso, supra note 4 (explaining that assertive families can drive a
bargain, whereas weaker families tend to accept whatever is offered).
207 See 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 30:5 (4th ed. 1993) (explaining that “a clear and
unambiguous writing may not be amplified by extrinsic evidence,” but extrinsic evi-
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tion of ambiguity considers the extent to which the bargaining par-
ties are conversant in the “particular trade or business” involved.208
This rule bars consideration of parole evidence beyond the four
corners of a written document, limiting resolution of contractual
disputes to application of the four corners of a writing that embod-
ies an agreement. Evidence external to the writing may be admit-
ted only to explain ambiguities or to aid understanding of the
language.209 There are sound reasons to borrow elements of this
rule in resolving disputes over the sufficiency of IEPs offered to
parents by school districts.
“[F]ormalistic procedures to protect parental rights” should
“level the playing field between parents and educators.”210 How-
ever, the legal and procedural protections afforded by the Act have
done little to redress the imbalance of power and adversarial at-
mosphere that pervades the IEP development process.211 Contrac-
tualization responds to crucial concerns. First, it provides a
document affording greater protection for parents. Additionally,
contractualization encourages greater specificity in drafting IEPs
and fosters communication between school districts and parents.212
dence may be considered in determining whether a writing is ambiguous); 17A AM.
JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 331 (West, WestlawNext 2013) (a contract is ambiguous if its
language is capable of more than one meaning).
208 17A AM. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 331 (West, WestlawNext 2013).
209 17A C.J.S. CONTRACTS § 394 (West, WestlawNext 2013); 11 WILLISTON & LORD,
supra note 207, § 32:5; id. § 33:4 (the writing is the agreement). See also 36 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS 3d § 331 (West, WestlawNext 2013).
210 Kotler, supra note 4, at 341.
211 Romberg, supra note 2, at 438.
212 A primary objective of the 2004 amendments to the IDEA was to improve and
foster cooperation among parents and school districts. In reporting the amendments
to the full Senate for passage, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions noted:
The committee is discouraged to hear that many parents, teachers,
and school officials find that some current IDEA provisions encourage
an adversarial, rather than a cooperative, atmosphere, in regards to spe-
cial education. In response, the committee has made changes to pro-
mote better cooperation and understanding between parents and
schools, leading to better educational programs and related services for
children with disabilities.
S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 6 (2003). But precedents have not followed suit. Two cases
from the Southern District of New York held that information readily known to the
parents need not be included in the IEP. In M.F. v. Irvington Union Free School District,
719 F. Supp. 2d 302 (S.D.N.Y 2010), the court found that procedural concerns of
notice were satisfied when a reading program was in the student’s written schedule.
Id. at 310–11. And in M.C. v. Katohah/Lewisboro Union Free School District, No. 10-CV-
6268, 2012 WL 834350 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2012), the court found no need to specify
provision of a reading program in the IEP where the parent was aware that reading
was part of the program’s services—and even though reading instruction was speci-
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Finally, contractualization recognizes the social construct that has
developed over the thirty-year history of the IDEA that views IEPs
as contracts.213 For example, the IEP Process Guide appearing on
the website for the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and
Secondary Education explicitly states, in bold print, “the IEP is a
contract between the school district and the parent.”214
R.E. made a positive, but not sufficiently forceful contribution
to a body of law aimed at parent protection. In addition to preclud-
ing retrospective testimony, the R.E. court should have declared
that an IEP represents an enforceable agreement between school
districts that cannot be modified by extrinsic testimony or evi-
dence. At the same time, the court was limited by the IDEA’s terms.
Thus, future amendments to the IDEA should characterize the IEP
as an “agreement” rather than merely a “written statement.”
CONCLUSION
The IDEA has had massive, positive social impact. Opening
schools to people of various abilities has profoundly impacted soci-
ety, making disability “a normal part of the broad range of human
experience and personality.”215 People who would have been hid-
den away from society in the 1970s are seen in schools, the eco-
nomic workforce, and even in popular culture.
For those parents who have had to advocate for their children,
however, the process often remains daunting, overwhelming and
fied in a subsequent IEP. Id. at *9–10. These cases illustrate how precedent can erode
parental protections.
213 Caruso, supra note 4, at 174–77.
214 MASS. DEPT. OF EDUC., IEP PROCESS GUIDE 13 (2001), available at http://www.
doe.mass.edu/sped/iep/proguide.pdf. The guide further notes that “[t]he IEP
should reflect the decisions made at the Team meeting and should serve as a contract
between the school system and parent(s).” Id. The Texas Project FIRST is an informa-
tional website developed by the Texas Education Agency to provide accurate informa-
tion to parents and families of students with disabilities. That site states that “the IEP
is like a contract with the school . . . .” Developing an IEP: The Five “W”s, TEXAS PROJECT
FIRST, https://texasprojectfirst.org/DevelopingAnIEP.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2014). Moreover, the Rutgers University School of Law Special Education Clinic has
posted an informational pamphlet on its website stating that “[t]he IEP is a contract
between the child’s parent/guardian and the school district.” See RUTGERS UNIV. SCH.
OF LAW, INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATION PROGRAM (I.E.P.): A GUIDE FOR PARENTS AND
GUARDIANS (n.d.), available at http://specialeducation.rutgers.edu/ieppamphlet2
.pdf.
215 Engel, supra note 4, at 204. See also S. REP. NO. 104-275, at 7–8 (1996) (noting
that since the enactment of the EHCA and the IDEA “children with disabilities are
now much more likely to be valued members of school communities, and the Nation
can look forward to a day when people with disabilities will be valued members of all
American communities”).
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exhausting. IEP formulation meetings are often fraught with ten-
sion. Parents are faced with the challenge of absorbing a tremen-
dous amount of information; they need to learn about their
children’s disability, educational methodology, and the law.216 The
balance of resources and information greatly favors school admin-
istrators over parents. IEP formulation meetings often involve a
lone parent facing a table of teachers and administrators in a meet-
ing that is supposed to be collaborative, but is more often intimi-
dating and tense. One way to redress this imbalance is to
strengthen the legal structure intended for parent protection
through terminology consistent with contractualization. Until
then, however, the R.E. rule prohibiting retrospective testimony in
disputes contesting IEP sufficiency creeps toward the ideal.
216 My own experience advocating for my child from 2010 to 2012 is reflective of
this opinion. I spent several years advocating in a public school system on behalf of a
child who is gifted but dogged by non-visible, brain-based disabilities. It was unpleas-
ant, aggravating, and tiring for everyone involved. It fell to me to tell the school dis-
trict how to work with my child. I also met individually with teachers to discuss the
disabilities at issue. My impression was that they had no understanding whatsoever of
the disabilities identified in the IEP which, being extremely charitable, I will assume
they read—and this was in a small, affluent school district. I wish I could say that my
experience was unique, but it wasn’t—and isn’t. In the end, faults in the system fortui-
tously led to a better situation for my child when the district permitted her to leave
early to attend college. I do hope that my efforts at that particular school have led to
positive improvements to the benefit of all of the students there. I must also refer to
the acknowledgment of similar experience in the works of David M. Engel, supra note
4, at 187–89, and Martin A. Kotler, supra note 4, both of which were written over
twenty years ago.

